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GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND NEW YORK INDIAN LANDS-A
REASSESSMENT OF A PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS*
By

GERALD GUNTHER**

t] 'tNDIANSON THE Warpath Here"'-so, in a headline more likely to amuse
.1 than to terrorize, a New York City tabloid recently characterized a federal
court action by the Tuscarora Indians to invalidate, for lack of federal consent, the
New York Power Authority's appropriation of reservation lands for construction
of the Niagara River Power Project.2 Through reports such as these, many learned
for the first time that Indian tribes indeed still reside in New York-remnants of
the once mighty Iroquois Confederacy, some 7,000 strong, on seven reservations of
over 85,000 acres.3 More significantly, the recent flurry of claims relating to
New York Indians indicates that the problem of delineating federal and state
authority over reservation lands, long a source of confusion and dispute, has
not lost its capacity to generate controversy.
The broad bases for the traditional opposing positions, if not the resulting
complications, may be simply stated. Assertions of an overriding federal power
with respect to tribal lands rest in the first instance on the federal Constitution
itself: 4 the authorization of congressional regulation of "commerce with the
Indian tribes" and the national treaty-making power, which extends to agreements
*This article is based in part on a study conducted during June, 1957, in
connection with the work of the Inter-Law School Committee on Constitutional
Simplification, which the author served as Director of Research. The Committee
was created in 1957 at the behest of The Temporary State Commission on the
Constitutional Convention. The views of the Committee on the subject-matter of
this article appear in. its final report. See ch. V, INDIAN
LEGISLATIVE

COMMITTEE ON

THE REVISION AND

LANDS,

in N. Y. SPECIAL

SIMPLIFICATION

OF THE CONSTI-

TUTION, LEG. Doe. (1958) No. 57, pp. 33-42. The responsibility for the statements
and conclusions in this article is of course entirely the author's.
**Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University, School of Law.
1. N. Y. Daily News, April 25, 1958, p. 4, col. 1-3.
2. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 164 F.Supp. 107
(W.D.N.Y. 1958), modified 257 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied (Tuscarora
Nations petition). 79 S. Ct. 66 (1958), appeaZ docketed, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3087 (U.S.
Sep. 19, 1958) (No. 386), Sub. nom. Johnson v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians.
3. The federally recognized tribes are the Senecas, Tonawandas, Tuscaroras,
Onondagas, St. Regis, Oneidas, and Cayugas. Their reservations are the Allegany,
Cattaraugus, Oil Springs, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Onondaga and St. Regis. For
detailed population and acreage figures, see Letter of Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior, March 1, 1948, in S. Rep. No. 1137, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1948) and "Background Data on Indians of New York," submitted by Orme
Lewis, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to the Speaker of the United States
House of Representatives, Jan. 4, 1954, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, Tuscarora Nations
case, note 2 supra. This discussion is largely limited to these federally recognized
tribes.
There are also two small Indian tribes on Long Island, the Shinnecocks and
the Poosepatucks, residing on 250-acre and 50-acre reservations respectively.
These tribes are recognized as Indians by the state, but not by the federal
government. See text accompanying notes 130-132 infra.
4. See generally COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, ch. 5 [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
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with the Indian tribes. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
a pervoeive federal power of guardianship over tribal Indians without reference to
specific constitutional provisions: the "weakness" and "helplessness" of the Indian
tribes, "so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with
them," has led the Court to find a national "duty of protection, and with it the
power" over these "wards of nation" owing "no allegiance to the States."6
As to American Indians generally, then, the view that the national government
possesses in effect "a new power, a power to regulate Indians, '6 has been widely
accepted. New York, however, has repeatedly argued the inapplicability of federal
authority to the state's Indians. New York, after all, antedated the United States,
and New York's Indian tribes, unlike those of most other states, are not settled
on lands that were once part of the national domain. 7 And the continuation of
state practices as to Indian matters even after the ratification of the Constitution,
it is urged, supports New York's claim of a special guardianship authority over
tribal lands.
The confusions engendered by these polar contentions barred any easy
resolution of the conflict between state and federal jurisdictional claims. Yet
the long history of uncertainty as to regulatory power over Indian affairs reveals
a slowly emerging recognition that at least the. special area of tribal land transactions is one of overriding federal concern. Only during the last two decades,
however, has the allocation of power over Indian lands been clarified sufficiently
to warrant the expectation that the recurring doubts and disputes may finally
cease. That cessation has not yet come, as the Tuscarora litigation indicates. An
examination of the turbulent history of New York Indian land matters,8 then,
may contribute to the long-needed reassessment of attitudes and actions
by both Nation and State. Full acceptance of federal authority over
alienation of tribal lands is amply warranted today. Such acknowledgment would
carry profound implications for both governments: for the United States, a
more consistent exercise of an oft-neglected responsibility; for New York, a
5. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886); see also Chief
Justice Marshall's opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1
(1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 515 (1832).

6. Rice, The position of the American Indian in the Law of the United
States, XVI J. CoMp. LEG. & INTL L. (3d ser.) 78, 81 (1934); and see United States

v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 (1926).

7. For the varied sources of tribal interests in New York reservation lands,

from original title to purchase from private groups, see

SPECIAL Cotiamrn

APPOINTED BY THE N. Y. ASSEMBLY OF 1888 TO INVESTIGATE THE "INDIAN PROBLEMI"
OF THE STATE, REPORT, Doc. No. 51, 7 Ass. Docs., 112th Sess. (1889) (hereinafter
cited as WHIPPLE REPORT); SENECAS AND OTHER INDIANS OF THE FIVE NATIONS OF

NEW YORK, H. R. Doc. No. 1590, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 11-25 (1915) (hereinafter
cited as REEvEs REPORT); COHEN, ch. 25; and Manley, New York Indian Reservations in N. Y. JOINT LEGISLATV CoMMTTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEG.
Dbc. (1948) No. 64, pp. 9-12.
8. For general historical background of New York Indian affairs, see
IV LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEw YoRK 152-174 (1906) [hereinafter
cited as LINCOLN]; WHIppLE REPORT; REEvES REPORT; and COHEN, ch. 25.
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simplification of its Constitution, a revision of its statutes, and a concentration of
its energies on those Indian affairs properly within the state's authority. Protection
of tribal lands-long the asserted policy of each government but, ironically, the
frequent victim of federal-state disputes over the power of guardianship-may
then be fully realized at last.
JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS AND CONFUSIONS, 1777-1942
Early State and National Action,
New York has asserted guardianship over Indian land transactions almost
from the beginning of its independence. The first constitution of the state,
adopted in 1777, contained a requirement that the legislature consent to any sale
of Indian lands 9-a provision whose operative portions have been retained in the
constitution to this day.' 0 Its purposes when it was proposed at the first
constitutional convention by John Jay are considerably dearer than its present
significance and validity. The 1777 preamble stated the need for state supervision
succinctly:
"AND WHEREAS, It is of great importance to the safety of this
state that peace and amity with the Indians within the same be at all
times supported and maintained; AND WHEREAS, The frauds too
often practiced toward the said Indians, in contracts made for their
lands, have, in divers instances, been productive of dangerous discontents and animosities; BE IT ORDAINED, That no purchases or
contracts for the sale of lands made since the 14th day of October,
in the year of oir Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five,
or which may hereafter be made with or of the said Indians, within the
limits of this state, shall be binding on the said Indians, or deemed
valid, unless made under the authority and with the consent of the
legislature of this state.""
The importance of "peace and amity" with the Indians had long been
apparent to the colonists of New York'" The Iroquois Confederacy'3 was a
powerful and influential group, politically the most advanced of all Indians
north of Mexico, with vast territorial holdings and in control of important
waterways and the western fur trade. Governmental supervision of land dealings
9. N.Y. CONsT. art. 37 (1777).
10. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, §13. The explanatory preamble of the 1777 provision
was dropped, and the section assumed substantially its present form, in the
Constitution of 1821. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §12 (1821).
11. N.Y. CONs'T. art. 37 (1777).
12. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 693, 712 (N.Y. 1823).
13. The Iroquois were originally referred to as the Five Nations-the
Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida and Mohawk tribes. When the Tuscaroras,
who migrated from North Carolina during the eighteenth century, joined the
Confederacy, the Iroquois became known as the Six Nations.
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with the Iroquois had traditionally been viewed as vital to peaceful relations.
Even The Dutch, who were more interested in promoting trade than in acquiring
land, recognized Indian title as extinguishable only by treaty or purchase and,
as early as 1629, required settlers "to satisfy the Indians for the land they 6hall
settle upon."1 4 The English, who assumed control of the colony in 1664,
continued the policy of acquiring Indian lands by means other than force.",
And a requirement strikingly similar to the Indian lands provision of the 1777
constitution was adopted by the second session of the colonial assembly in 1684:
. .. from henceforward noe Purchase of Lands from the Indians shall bee
esteemed a good Title without Leave first had and obtained from the Governour.
. . ."16 Continuation of this protective policy was of particular importance when
New York's initial constitution was framed. Indian attacks under English
leadership were an active threat to the state's well-being. The western part of
New York was still almost wholly held by the Iroquois. Conciliatory gestures
were highly desirable, not only to abate present hostilities but to forestall fresh
outbreaks which might be provoked by unscrupulous land dealings with Indians
17
after peace was restored.
Yet not even during the Revolutionary period were Indian affairs a matter
of exclusively state concern. As early as 1775, the Continental Congress concluded
a treaty to assure neutrality by the Iroquois, although individual tribes remained
free to take sides.18 And at the end of the Revolution, the national government
established by the Articles of Confederation insisted that conclusion of a peace
treaty with the Iroquois was its responsibility. New York, anxious to remove
hostile tribes from the state, claimed the right to deal with the Indians separately,
obstructed the central government's negotiations and indeed arrested some of the
national agents. Despite New York opposition, the United States and the
Iroquois concluded a treaty in 1784 in which the United States agreed that the
Indian tribes "shall be secured in the possession" of specified New York lands'9o
the first in a series of still effective national guarantees of the Iroquois' right of
occupancy.
National concern with Indian lands intensified after the ratification of the
United States Constitution. Congress quickly acted to require federal supervision
14. IV LINCOLN 154.
15. As the struggle between England and France for control of North
America mounted, the English assumed a general protectorate responsibility over
the Iroquois by treaties in 1701 and 1726. IV id. at 155-59. See also the discussion
of English policy in Jackson v. Porter, 13 Fed. Cas. 235 (No. 7143) (C.C. N.D.
N.Y. 1825).
16. Law of Oct. 23, 1684, ch. 9, Laws of First General Assembly, 2d Sess.,
1 NEW YORK COLONIAL LAws 149 (1894 ed.).

17. VI REPORTS OF NEV YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMasrrsE, PROBLEIS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE 202 (1938).
18. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 693, 712 (N.Y. 1823).
19. Treaty of Oct. 22, 1784, with the Six Nations, 7 Stat. 15.
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of Indian land sales. The First Indian Non-Intercourse Act, adopted in 1790,
provided that no sale of lands by "any Indians ... within the United States ...
to any person .. or to any state" could be valid "unless the same shall be made
and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United
States."20 The Second Indian Non-Intercourse Act amplified this restriction
in 1793 by making it a misdemeanor to negotiate with Indians for the
purchase of their lands without federal authority, although it specifically permitted
agents of a state to propose settlements of Indian claims to lands in the state,
"in the presence, and with the approbation of the commissioner or commissioners
of the United States."21 Such federal consent restrictions were continued in
subsequent legislation and form part of federal law today. 22 Moreover, continued
unrest among the Iroquois led the United States to conclude a further treaty
with the Iroquois in 1794.23 In that treaty the boundaries of Seneca territory
were defined and the United States "acknowledged all the land within the
aforementioned boundaries, to be the property of the Seneka nation; and the
United States will never claim the same, nor disturb the Seneka nation, nor any
of the Six Nations, nor of their friends residing thereon and united with them,
in the free use and enjoyment thereof: but it shall remain theirs, until they choose
to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have the right to
purchase." Other provisions contained identical promises as to "the lands
reserved to the Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga Nations, in their respective treaties
with the State of New York, and called their reservations" and granted to the
Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy an annuity to be spent for the purchase*
of goods for the Indians "by the superintendent appointed by the President for
the affairs of the Six Nations."
On their face, the federal statutory restrictions seem applicable to New York
tribal lands, as the treaty guarantees specifically are. Nevertheless, early land
20. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137.
21. Act of March 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329.
22. 25 U.S.C. 177: "PURCHASES on GRANTS OF LANDS FROM INDIANS. No pur-

chase, grant, lease or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,

from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution. Every person who, not being employed under the authority of
the United States, attempts to negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or
Indirectly, or to treat with any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or
purchase of any lands by them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000.
The agent of any State who may be present at any treaty held with Indians
under the authority of the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the same, may,
however, propose to, and adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made
for their claim to lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty."
As a result of an 1871 law, now 25 U.S.C. 71, Congress ceased dealing with
Indians by treaty, but preserved preexisting treaty rights. Since then, the federal
government has dealt with Indian matters through legislation.
23. Treaty of Nov. 11, 1794, with the Six Nations, 7 Stat. 44. An earlier
treaty designed to end Iroquois attacks was not ratified. Treaty of Jan. 9, 1789,
with the Six Nations, 7 Stat. 33.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
purchases from New York Indians were not in all cases marked by federal
participalion and consent. In many instances, to be sure, the state acquired large
tracts by treaties with Indian tribes under the authority of the United States and
after negotiations participated in by federal officials 2 4 Similarly, Indians sold
lands to private persons pursuant to agreements under federal authority and with
federal agents' participation. 25 Howeve', between 1785 and 1790 and to some
extent thereafter, New York acquired much land from Indians through treaties
-perhaps as many as 200 2 ---not participated in, though apparently known and
not objected to, by the national government. 2 7
The alienation of Indian lands without federal consent even after the
federal Constitution, treaties and statutes became effective is probably explainable
as a relatively unquestioned continuation of New York practices and notions of
state power developed under the Articles of Confederation. Under the Articles,
a vaguely defined state power over Indians was recognized 28 and national officials
appeared to accept New York acquisitions of Indian lands. 29 State legislation, such
as a New York law of 1785 directing state commissioners "to obtain a cession or
grant, to the use of the people of this state, of such lands within this state now
holden or claimed by the native Indians as such Indians are willing to dispose of
on reasonable terms",o was thus an understandable product of prevalent views as
to state power. Understandable too, before the passage of the federal NonIntercourse Acts, were the New York legislature's actions in 1788 implementing
24. See, for example, the Mohawks' relinquishment of their claims to New
York lands in exchange for the payment of $1,000 by the State.- RELINQUISHMENT
TO NEW YORK, BY THE MOHAWK NATION OF INDIANS, UNDER THE SANCTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OF ALL CLAIMS TO LANDS IN THAT STATE, March 29,

1747, 7 Stat. 61.
25. See, for example, the agreement between Robert Morris and the Senecas,
noting the presence and approval of a federal commissioner and stating that such
procedure was "in pursuance of the act of Congress of the United States."
Contract Entered Into, Under the Sanction of the United States of America,
Between Robert Morris and the Seneka Nation of Indians, Sept. 15, 1797, 7 Stat.,
App. I.

26. COHEN 420, n.24. A number of New York treaties with the Indians are

reprinted in WHwIPLE REPORT, App. D, 190-382. See also United States v. Boylan,
265 Fed. 165 (2d Cir. 1920).
27. IV LINCOLN 646; Brief for the Warden and the State of New York,
p. 9, New York ex reZ. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
28. Thus, the Indian provision of the Articles expressly preserved "the
legislative right of any State within its limits." ARTICLE s OF CONFEDERATION,
art. IX.
29. See Brief for the Warden and the State of New York, pp. 8-9, New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946). For example, Congress approved a
compromise concluded by Masachusetts and New York, by which the states settled
a dispute over Indian lands in western New York. By the agreement, New York's
sovereignty over certain lands was recognized, but Massachusetts retained the
right to purchase the lands from the Indians. Massachusetts in turn conveyed Its
preemptive rights to Robert Morris, who subsequently, in 1797, made an agreement with the Senecas, under federal supervision. See note 25, supra.
30. IV LINCOLN 164.
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the State Constitution's ban on unauthorized private transactions in Indian
31
lands.
The momentum of such practices undoubtedly contributed to the relatively
undiminished assertions of state power even after the manifestations of national
authority in the 1790's. Additional laws appointing state agents to acquire
tribal lands were enacted.3 2 And as state purchases of lands diminished early in
33
the nineteenth century, legislative regulations of Indian affairs proliferated.
State legal advisers for the Indians were provided and sale of intoxicants was
prohibited. Moreover, the lack of federal attention during this period encouraged
New York to assume an expanding guardianship over its Indians. Thus, an
1813 state law banning the cutting of lumber on tribal lands was made enforceable
by the Federal Indian Agent, but in 1821 Indians complained that enforcement
was inadequate and the state legislature transferred the task of guarding against
34
intruders to the county district attorneys.
The Emergence of FederalSupremacy over Tribal
Lands Duringthe Nineteenth Century
By the 1830's, then, state Indian legislation was fairly comprehensive and
state control over Indian affairs was generally unquestioned. A series of events
during this period, however, soon produced the first serious challenge to New
York's supervision of Indian lands. In 1835, the state legislature began to
authorize private leases of Seneca reservation lands. Settlers and railroad
companies leased property on the Allegany reservation of the Senecas and the
city of Salamanca became an important transfer point. Some of these leases were
based on prior state permission; others were ratified by the legislature after
execution; none, however, had been approved by the federal government.3 5
Other events led to renewed federal interest in New York Indians. The state had
31.

See Law of March 18, 1788, 2 N.Y. LAws (Greenleaf ed.) 194. A 1788

resolution invalidated long-term leases of Indian lands made without the authorization required by the state constitution, and a statute subjected purchases and
contracts for purchases of lands in violation of the constitutional provision to
forfeiture, fine and imprisonment. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 693,
727 (N.Y. 1823).

All of the early litigation involving the Indian lands provision of the state
constitution dealt with lands granted by New York to individual Indian veterans
of the Revolution rather than with federally protected tribal lands. See ibid., and

Lee v. Glover, 8 Cow. 189 (N.Y. 1828). See also Murray v. Wooden, 17 Wend. 531

(N.Y. 1837), holding state restrictions applicable because federal regulation did
not cover "sales of the bounty lands granted to individual Indians by the state."
32. Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 693, 730 (N.Y. 1823).

33. See Chancellor Kent's summary of early state Indian legislation, ibid,
and the comprehensive "Act relative to Indians," Law of April 4, 1801, 1 N.Y.
LAws (2d ed. Webster & Skinner) 464. Much of today's codified Indian Law of
New York has its antecedents in regulations of that period.
34. See Brief for the Warden and the State of New York, pp. 17-18, New
York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
35. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1942).
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long sought the removal of its Indians to the WestOG but believed this to be an
area in which federal action was necessary. Some New York Indians moved to
Wisconsin under federal supervision in the 1830's. By a Treaty of 1838,37 almost
all of the New York tribes agreed to remove, partly because of a dispute with zhe
Ogden Land Company which claimed an interest in their lands.38 Several tribes,
however, insisted on remaining and the federal government did not wish to expel
them forcibly. Accordingly, the Ogden group and the Senecas, mruder federal
supervision, negotiated a compromise which was incorporated in an 1842 treaty
between the Senecas and the United States.39 Under this treaty, the Allegany
and Cattaraugus Reservations were assured to the Senecas in exchange for release
of other Indian lands.40 Once again, as it had in the nineteenth century, the
United States assumed treaty obligations to protect New York Indian lands.
With the Treaty of 1842, the period of federal inattention and relatively
unquestioned state control appears to have ended. To be sure, the Indians
continued to look to the state for protection. Elaborate provisions with respect
to tribal government were added to the Indian Code 41 and the Seneca Constitution
of 1848 was recognized by the state. But the right of the state to protect Indian
lands against intruders, asserted in legislation since 1813, was soon challenged
under federal law. The United States Supreme Court, in New York ex rel.
Cutler v. Dibble,42 appeared to calm doubts over the validity of state regulation
by holding, on the basis of a vaguely defined police power, that the state could
36.

COHEN 420.

37. Treaty with the New York Indians, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550.
38. The Ogden claim has been a pervasive source of difficulty in the handling
of New York Indian matters. This "peculiar . . . complicated and perplexing"
claim, WHIPPLE: REPORT 34, is derived from private grantees of the pre-emption
rights obtained by Masachusetts in the 1786 compromise with New York, see notes
25 and 29 supra, and affects the Allegany, Cattaraugus and Tuscarora Reservations, see N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COM
rITTEE
ON INDIAN AFFAIRS REPORT, LEG. DOC.
(1944) No. 51, 6-7. The history of the dispute is recounted in detail in the
WHIPPLE and REEVES REPORTS.
39. Treaty of May 20, 1842, 7 Stat. 586.
40. One of the areas purportedly released by the Senecas under this agreement was the reservation of the Tonawanda band of Seneca Indians. The Tonawandas claimed that they had not agreed to the 1842 treaty, refused to move
from the land, and split off from the Senecas. The federal government ultimately
negotiated a separate treaty with the Tonawandas, Treaty of Nov. 5, 1857, 11
Stat. 735, by which the Tonawandas purchased their present reservation. By the
1857 Treaty, title to the land was held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior,

"until the legislature of the State of New York shall pass an act designating
some persons, or public officer of that State, to take and hold said land upon a
similar trust for said Indians." After state legislation in 1860 the federal government transferred title to the State Comptroller in trust. See WHIPPLE REPORT.
This unique history was relied upon in finding federal consent to state authorizations of Tonawanda Reservation leases. United States v. National Gypsum Company, 141 F. 2d 859 (2d Cir. 1944).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAW §§41-43, as revised from N.Y. Laws 1847,

ch. 365.
42.

21 How. (62 U.S.) 366 (1858).
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apply its laws to remove intruders from Tonawanda lands.4 3 Although Congress
had enacted laws to protect the Indian's possession of tribal lands as early as
1802, New York's similar legislation was not thereby barred: "The statute in
question is a police regulation for the protection of the Indians from the
intrusion of the white people, and to preserve the peace. It is the dictate of a
prudent and just policy. Notwithstanding the peculiar relation which these
Indian nations hold to the Government of the United States, the State of New
York had the power of a sovereign over their persons and property, so far as it
was necessary to preserve the peace of the Commonwealth, and protect these
44
feeble and helpless bands from imposition and intrusion."

Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court curtailed New York's power
sharply, in an opinion with dicta as broadly restrictive of state power as the
Dibble opinion had provided in the opposite direction. The New York Indians45
involved New York's attempt to tax lands from which the Senecas had agreed to
remove by the Treaty of 1838. The tax laws were enacted in 1840 and 1841,
before the Treaty of 1842 had assured the Senecas retention of certain of the
lands. The 1840 law authorized sale of the lands in case of the default in tax
payments; the 1841 law had added a proviso that "no sale for the purpose of
collecting said taxes shall in any manner affect the right of the Indians to occupy
said lands." The New York Court of Appeals had invalidated only the 1840
statute; the Supreme Court voided the 1841 tax as well, despite the proviso. The
Court did not agree that the transfer of the lands to non-Indians pursuant to the
1838 Treaty gave New York power to subject the property to taxation while the
Indians were still in possession. Nor did the Court give much weight to New
York's attempt to protect the Indians' possessory rights through the 1841
proviso: "The rights of the Indians do not depend on this or any other statutes
of the State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land."
Emphasizing the repeated federal guarantees to the Indians since the Treaty of
1784, and relying upon a companion case in which it had stated that Indian tribes
are "governed exclusively by the government of the Union,' 46 the Court
concluded: "Until the Indians have sold their lands, and removed from them in
pursuance of the treaty stipulations, they are . . . entitled to the undisturbed
enjoyment of them. . . . We must say, regarding these reservations as wholly
43. In an earlier decision relating to New York Indian lands, Fellows v.
Blacksmith, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 366 (1856), the Court held that the Ogden claimants
did not have the right to remove Tonawandas from lands surrendered by the
1842 Treaty. See note 40 supra. The Court stated that "the removal of . . .
Indians from their ancient possessions" must be by the authority of the federal
government and "under its care and superintendence." 19 How. (60 U.S.), at
370-71.
44. 21 How. (62 U.S.), at 370.
45. 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 761 (1866).
46. The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 737 (1866).
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exempt from State taxation .
unwarrantable interference ....

.

. the exercise of this authority over them is an
47

Nor were the broad dicta of the Dibble case sufficient to uphold New York's
authorizations of tribal property leases, particularly in the Salamanca area.
Though such authorizations had been ittempted by New York since 1835, an
unreported New York Supreme Court decision in 1870 held the leases void for
lack of federal ratification. 4 The state legislature promptly sought such ratification, in a resolution reciting: "Whereas, The Legislature of the State of New
York has, at different times, ratified and confirmed leases between Indian and
white settlers on the Alleghany Indian reservation . . .; and Whereas, The courts
of this State have decided that said ratification is null and void, the Congress of
the United States alone possessing power to deal with and for the Indians. . ... 49
Congress legalized some of the leases, established certain villages on the reserva50
By this act and subsequent
tions of the Senecas, and provided for new leases.
modifications, leases on these reservations continue to be regulated by the federal
government 5l
New York's growing awareness of its relative impotence with respect to
Indian land transactions during the latter part of the nineteenth century culminated
52
in an important New York decision in 1894, Bufalo, R. & P. R. Co. v. Lavery.
That was a dispute between two non-Indians claiming leasehold interests in
certain property in Salamanca. One claimed under a lease from the Senecas
allegedly authorized by a New York statute of 1835; the other, under a lease
made pursuant to the Congressional legislation of 1875. The court held for the
latter claimant, in an opinion which circumscribed state power sharply and
clearly:
it is not within the legislative power of the State to enable
the Indian nation to make, or others to take from the Indians, grants or
leases of land within the reservations. In that matter, the Federal
Government, having the power to do so, has assumed to control it by
the act of Congress of June 30, 1834 [a successor to the earlier Indian
47. 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) at 770-71. The Court noted with gratification, id. at
771, that the New York legislature had in 1857 barred any taxation of Allegany
and Cattaraugus Reservation lands. A section of the present Indian Law, derived
from the 1858 statue, exempts all New York Indian reservations from taxation,

"so long as the land of such reservation shall remain the proparty of the nation,
tribe or band occupying the same." N.Y.
§4(4).

INDIAN LAw,

§6. See also N.Y. TAX LAW

48. See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1942); Brief
for the Warden and the State of New York, pp. 26-27, New York ex rel. Ray v.

Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
49. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1875,

98TH

SESS., 819. See H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 75,

43D CONG., 2D SEss. (1875).

50. Act of Feb. 19, 1875, 18 Stat. 330.
51. See COHEN 421.
52.

75 Hun. (N.Y.) 396 (1894), aff'd on opinion below, 149 N.Y. 576 (1896).
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Intercourse Acts]....

As respects their lands, subject only to the pre-

emptive title, the Indians are treated as wards of the United States, and
it is only pursuant to the Federal authority that their lands can be
granted or demised by or acquired by conveyance or lease from them.
"53

Renewed JurisdictionalDoubts, 1889-1942
Though the state's lack of power as to tribal land transactions had become
increasingly dear, exclusive federal competence was not universally accepted. A
legitimate and commendable concern over conditions on the reservations induced
the State Assembly to establish a Special Committee in 1888 "to investigate the
'Indian Problem' of the State. '5 4 That Committee's recommendations assumed,
without explicit consideration of a possible overriding federal authority, that
the state could eliminate tribal property holdings. The Committee's study, the
Whipple Report, blamed the defects in Indian education, health and morals on
the persistance of a large degree of tribal self-government. 55 Indian peacemakers'
courts, applying tribal customs, were described as "inefficient and often corrupt."56
The Report stated the "invariable" answer discovered in its search for a solution
of the "Indian problem": "Exterminate the tribe and preserve the individual;
make citizens of them and divide their land in severalty."57
Whatever the merits of a policy of enforced58 assimilation of the Indians
into the non-Indian community in the late nineteenth century, the methods
suggested were of quiestionable legality. The Committee's recommendations"0
were not limited to the repeal of special Indian legislation and the extension of
state jurisdiction over Indian affairs generally. The Report also assumed that the
53. 75 Hun (N.Y.). at 399-400.
54. See WHIPPLE REPORT. James S. Whipple of Salamanca, N. Y., the chairman of the Social Committee of 1888-1889, was long active in New York Indian
affairs. He was also a member of the Committee on Relations to the Indians at
the Constitutional Convention of 1915. See 1915 N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONAL INDEX 180.
55. State law has recognized tribal self-government for many years. See
e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAw §75 (Senecas; derived from a law of 1847); id., §82 (Tonawandas; first enacted in 1863).
56. WHIPPLE REPORT 74.
57. Id. at 68.
Less drastic intra-tribal allotments for possessory purposes, which do not
affect underlying tribal rights or "break up" the reservations, have long been
known, see WHIPPLE and REEVES REPORTS, and continue to be recognized by state
law, see N.Y. INDIAN LAW, §55 (Seneca lands). See also United States v. Boylan.
265 Fed. 165 (2d Cir. 1920); United States v. Charles, 23 F. Supp. 346 (WD.N.Y.
1938).
58. The committee recognized that there would be Indian opposition but
concluded "bluntly" that Indian consent "should no longer be asked." WHIPPLE
REPORT

59.

73.
Id. at 78.
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state could alter Indian landholdings absent federal consent by proposing a
"radical uprooting of the tribal system" through division of tribal lands. 0
The Whipple Report did not result in legislative action. A further legislative
study, in 1906,1 proved equally fruitless. But the desire to end Indian separatism
persisted and was reflected in a constiti'tional amendment adopted by the 1915
Constitutional Convention, though subsequently rejected by the -voters.62 The
1915 amendment, however, would merely have abolished Indian court,, transferred
their jurisdiction to state courts, and extended state laws to the Indians, except
"as otherwise provided by the treaties of this state and the constitution, treaties
and laws of the United States." Significantly, the amendment fell far short of
accepting the Whipple Report proposals for dividing reservation lands as a means
of weakening tribal unity. On the contrary, the Report of the Convention's
Committee on Relations to the Indians stated flatly that the amendment was "not
intended to affect, nor can it in any way affect, the tribal lands of the Indians,"
03
because they could be disposed of only with federal consent.
Even the limited proposal of the 1915 Convention was in some quarters
thought to exceed state powers. Thus, the Attorney General of New York ruled
in the same year, 1915, that reservation Indians could not be prosecuted in the
state courts for violation of the Conservation Law.64 While the 1915 Convention
Committee found lack of state power only where Congress had affirmatively
acted,6 5 the Attorney General insisted that congressional power of Indians was
60. An unsuccessful proposal to amend the constitution in 1867 had included

a similar plan to divide tribal lands. See V DOCUMENTS OF 1867-68 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, No. 170. Significantly, one member of the Comrittee on Indian

Affairs of the 1867 Constitutional Convention opposed the amendment because'
"this State has no jurisdiction whatever of the Indians at all. The United States
have decided that they have the entire jurisdiction over them .... " IV PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, 1867-68 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 2926. Jurisdictional objections also played a role in the debate on the Convention floor which led to the
defeat of the proposed amendment. See V id., 3435-48, esp. at 3443 ("I do not
think this scheme is at all consistent with the Federal Constitution. I do not
think ... power resides with the people of this State. .. ")
61. See COMMITTE ON RELATIONS TO THE INDIANS, REPORT, Doc. No. 26, 1915
N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DOCUMENTS, 2-3.
62. See ibid; II PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 1915 N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, INT. No. 707, PR. Nos. 769, 793, 799; II REVISED RECORD, 1915 N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1233-37, 1570-86.

63. See op. cit. supra note 61, at 4, 7.
64. 1915 OPs. N.Y. ATT'y GEN. (II 1915 REPORT N.Y. ATT'Y GEN.) 492.
65. The Committee relied largely on a narrow reading of New York ex rel.
Cusick v. Daly, 212 N.Y. 183 (1914), where the Court of Appeals had held that
New York lacked power to prosecute Indians for crimes committed on reservations and covered by federal legislation. The court explicitly rejected the argument often made by state officials that federal power over New York Indians Is
somehow less extensive than over Indians in the West. "There is no vital
distinction between our Indians and those of the west." 212 N.Y., at 193. See
also Matter of Patterson v. Seneca Nation, 245 N.Y. 433 (1927), where the Court
of Appeals took a much narrower view of state power over Indians than is found
in some earlier New York cases, e.g., Seneca Nation v. Christie, 126 N.Y. 122,
writ of error dismissed, 162 U.S. 283 (1896), and Jemison v. Bell Telephone Co.,
186 N.Y. 493 (1906).
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exclusive: "the principle that a state may act in the absence of affirmative legislation on the part of Congress is not applicable to the Government of Tribal
Indians."66 And, contrary to the Whipple Report's conclusions, the Attorney
General stated that only the federal government had power to terminate
guardianship over tribal Indians and break up their tribal organizations.6 7 A third
study published in 1915, by the United States Department of the Interior, 6s took
a middle-of-the-road position. It noted that "much needless confusion exists, a
pretty general impression prevailing that the State has exclusive jurisdiction;"' 9
challenged that claim because of the great growth of federal power over Indians;
thought that "jurisdiction seems concurrent rather than exclusive;" 70 urged
federal-state cooperation; and finally recommended that "In view of the superior
jurisdiction and power over the subject matter," Congress act to curtail tribal
71
self-government and eventually to divide tribal lands among individual Indians.
Such divided views were typical of the prevalent jurisdictional doubts in the
years subsequent to the Whipple Report. Debate focused largely on the
general extension of a state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians rather
than any proposals for direct interference with tribal property, but the distinction
between general regulation and action affecting Indian lands, stressed by the 1915
Convention Committee, was not usually made. Concern about the "doubt and
confusion ' about state power was repeatedly expressed, 72 but neither the state nor
the federal government took clarifying action and the state ccintinued to provide
educational and welfare services for its Indians, in the sum of about $400,000 a
year.73 So the situation remained 74 until a federal decision in 1942 compelled
renewed consideration of the status of New York Indians by state and federal
authorities-consideration which resulted in federal legislation producing greater
clarity than ever before in the history of the state.
66. Op cit. supra note 64, at 499.
67. Id. at 501.
68. REEVES REPORT 11-25.
69. Id. at 14.

70. Id. at 15.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N.Y. 47, 50 (1921). See also Rice v. Maybee, 2 F.
Supp. 669, 672 (W.D.N.Y. 1933); Pound, Nationals without a Nation: The New
York State Tribal Indians, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 97 (1922), and the reflection of the
jurisdictional confusion in VI REPORTS OF NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE, PROBLEMS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE 201-205 (1938).

73. See the Table of State Expenditures for Indian Welfare, 1911-1947, in

"New York Indians," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 683, S. 1686, S. 1687, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 221
(1948) (hereinafter cited as 1948 HEARINGS). The rate of expenditures exceeded
$500,000 annually by 1948. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, REPORT, Feb. 24, 1948, pp. 9-12, 9 N.Y. LEG. Does., 171sT SESS. (1948).
74. A 1930 proposal, H. R. 9720, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., that Congress cede
civil and criminal jurisdiction over New York Indians to the state was not enacted
because of tribal protests. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS REPORT, March 15, 1946, p. 5, 16 N.Y. LEG. Docs., 170TH SESS. (1947).
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JURISDICTIONAL CLARIFICATION, 1942-1958
The Forness Decision and Clarifying Federal Legislation.
The 1942 decision in United States v. Forness75 stemmed from an area of
New York Indian affairs which had yielded controversy since the 1830's-leases
of Indian lands in Salamanca, on the Allegany Reservation. Foi many years,
lessees of Seneca lands had been lax about rent payments. In 1940, during a period
of renewed federal interest in New York Indians, the United States brought a test
case on behalf of the Senecas to cancel a federally authorized lease for nonpayment
of some $44--eleven years' back rent. The Federal District Court refused to grant
the requested relief on grounds akin to waiver. 70 In its opinion, however, the
Court used broad language restrictive of state power: "The Indians are not
subject to state laws and the process of its courts.. . . This proposition has long
of the United States
since and many times been decided by the Supreme Court
77
and by the court of last resort in the State of New York."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing, rejected an
argument that cancellation of the leases was barred by the New York Civil
Practice Act. The Court found that Congress had not permitted application of the
Civil Practice Act, and added that "state law does not apply to the Indians except
so far as the United States has given its consent."78 State officials were disturbed
and aroused: the decision cast grave doubt on the state's assumption of a vaguely
defined concurrent jurisdiction over Indians; if allowed to stand, it would end all
hope that New York could extend its civil and criminal jurisdiction over the
reservations.79 When the Supreme Court refused to review the decision,80 renewed
attempts to clarify the Indians' status became necessary."'
The Joint Legislative Committee on Indian Affairs, established by the state
75. 125 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.).
76. United States v. Forness, 37 F. Supp. 337 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
77. 37 F. Supp., at 341.
78. 125 F.2d, at 932, (Emphasis added).
79. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEa.
Doc. (1944) No. 51, p. 4.
80. Certiorari denied sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U.S.
694 (1942).
81. Two subsequent decisions upholding state action did not allay New
York's concern, since they were decided on narrow grounds. United States v.
National Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1944), found federal consent to state
action in the particular history of the Tonawanda reservation. See note 40 supra.
New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), upheld the state's power to

prosecute a non-Indian for the murder of another non-Indian committed In Sala-

manca on the Allegany Reservation. The Supreme Court carefully restricted its

decision to crimes involving only non-Indians, despite the state's energetic effort,
supported by an exhaustive brief, to obtain a broader ruling as to New York's
regulatory jurisdiction over reservations. See Brief for the Warden and the
State of New York in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
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legislature in 1943,82 noted in its first report the "more or less continuous state of
confusion" about New York's authority over reservations. Despite extensive
provision of state services and the federal government's "general policy of passive
non-interference," the Forness decision had undercut the notion that state exercises
of power were valid in the absence of federal action. The Committee urged
"appropriate action" by Congress to abolish the prevailing uncertainty and warned
that the "present system of dual responsibility is fostering disunity and internal
strife among the Indians of this State and is further seriously retarding their
83
assumption of the responsibilities and enjoyment of the privileges of citizenship."
By 1945, the Committee was able to report 84 that it had prepared draft bills for
congressional enactment, one authorizing state jurisdiction over criminal offenses,
the other over civil disputes on reservations. The Committee noted that Indian
leaders, except the Tonawandas, were opposed to the bills and explained:
"Opposition is... based in part upon a deep-rooted suspicion of
the white man not without some justification in the exploitation of
Indian property rights during an earlier but unforgotten era. ... In
order to overcome any fear that the proposed legislation is aimed at
destruction of the reservations, the Committee incorporated in the draft
dealing with civil jurisdiction assurances that such bill, if enacted,
could not be construed as subjecting reservation lands to taxation, neither
as making dismemberment possible by voluntary or involuntary sale. For
the protection of the Indian population it is important that these safeguards be incorporated in any legislation of the character proposed."85
The draft bills were submitted to the United States Department of Interior,
and the Acting Secretary agreed with the policy of general transfer of jurisdiction
to the state courts. He insisted, however, that "any such transfer of jurisdiction
must be qualified so as to preserve the capacity of the federal government to take
appropriate action for the protection of restricted Indian property and for the
discharge of all treaty obligations."8 6 Upon the Joint Committee's recommendation,
the state legislature in 1945 memorialized Congress to enact the proposed
legislation subjecting New York Indians to general state jurisdiction.87 Consider82. Resolution of March 8, 1943, N.Y. CONCURRENT REsOLuTrONS CREATING
AND

EXTENDING

SPECIAL JOINT LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING

COMMITTEEs, LEG. Doc.

(1944) No. 52, p. 32.
83. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEG. Doc.
(1944) No. 51, p. 4.
The general grant of citizenship to Indians, enacted by Congress in 1924
and now found in 8 U.S.C. §1401(a) (2), did not end federal guardianship. See
COHEN 97. The main result of the grant, in the eyes of New York Indian leaders,
was to assure Indians the right to vote in New York, see 1928 Ops. N.Y. ATT'y
GEN. 204-a rarely exercised right-and to subject Indians to the draft. See
generally 1948 HEARINGS.
84. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEG. DOC.

(1945) No. 51.
85.

Id. at 4.

86. Id. at 8 (Exhibit C).
87. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON
1946, 16 N.Y. LEG. Doc., 170TH SESS., 12 (1947).

INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, March 15,
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able negotiations between state and federal officials ensued, during which the
Joint Committee continued to reassure those Indians who saw "a sinister purpose
on the part of the state to seize their reservations, subject their lands to taxation
and destroy the remnants of their tribal existence" by reasserting the "state's
sincerity by provisions in the proposed bills expressly forbidding such interpretation."88 In 1947, the bills were fi,.ally introduced in Congress.8 9 Extensive
hearings were held and the views of state, federal and Indian representatives were
fully aired.90
Finally, in 1948, Congress enacted a statute authorizing state jurisdiction
over all criminal offenses committed on Indian reservations; 9' and in 1950, civil
disputes on reservations were similarly made amenable to state law. 92 The text
and history of the new legislation are replete with indications that congressional
consent is necessary to validate the exercise of state power over tribal Indians
and, most significantly, that New York cannot unilaterally deprive Indians of
their tribal lands or authorize such deprivations. The civil jurisdiction law, to
make assurance doubly sure, contains a proviso that explicitly exempts reservations
from state and local taxation and that negatives any authorization of "the
alienation from any Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians of any land within
' 3
any Indian reservation in the State of New York.""
The Senate Committee's
4
report on that law emphasizes that "State law does not apply to Indians except
so far as the United States has given its consent" and points out that the law
provides that "no lands within any reservation be alienated." During the congressional hearings, most Indian leaders continued to oppose the bills, partly because
of fear of state attempts to deprive them of their reservations, despite the New
York Joint Committee's repeated assurances. Accordingly, New York's representatives once more disavowed any intention to break up the reservations and, more
clearly than some state officials in the history of the controversy, disclaimed any
state power to do so. Moreover, both federal and state officials agreed that the
bills would retain ultimate federal power over the Indians and that federal
guardianship, particularly with respect to property rights, would continue.05
This clear-cut delineation of state and federal powers gave promise of a new
era in which energies might be diverted from jurisdictional disputes to the
furtherance of Indian welfare. The state did, indeed, intensify its interest in the
88. Id. at 13.

89. S. 1683, S. 1687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).

90. See 1948 HEARINGS.
91. 62 Stat. 1224, 25 U.S.C. §232.
92. 64 Stat. 845, 25 U.S.C. §233.
93. 25 U.S.C. §233.
94. S. REP. No. 1836, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See also S. REP. No. 1137,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reporting on an earlier bill.
95. See 1948 HEARINGS, especially the statements at 2, 9, 60, 79, 184, 210, and
213.
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Indians. The Joint Legislative Committee made studies and proposals with
respect to changes in state laws and services"6 and the Governor, in 1952, created
an Interdepartmental Committee on Indian Services headed by a Director of
Indian Services. 97 New York sought to encourage the maximum degree of
assimilation of its Indians, "to hasten the time when these people will voluntarily assume a vigorous and active role in our society,"98 in a program marked by
sympathetic consideration of Indian sensibilities and c-ustoms. 99 Yet not all
representatives of the state limited themselves to efforts so clearly within the
newly defined sphere of state authority. On the contrary, in the recent Tuscarora
litigation, state officials challenged federal control over the disposition of tribal
lands with almost unprecedented vigor and thoroughness. And, surprisingly, the
United States District Court accepted many of the broad state contentions. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, flatly rejected the sweeping
assertions of New York power and reaffirmed the continuance of exclusive
federal guardianship over tribal lands. This latest repudiation of a traditional
state position, obstinately reiterated in 1958 despite the reasonably dear teachings
of history, offers another opportunity to embark upon a new governmental
approach to New York Indian affairs--an approach long needed, adopted by
some, but not yet accepted by all.
The TuscaroraLitigation, 1958
After a history of controversy almost as turbulent as the falls of the
Niagara, 10 Congress, in 1957,101 directed the Federal Power Commission to
issue a license to the Power Authority of the State of New York for the construction of a power project to utilize the greatly enlarged United States share of
Niagara River water made available by a 1950 treaty with Canada. 10 2 The
See the recent annual reports of the Naw YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMINDIAN AFFAIRs: LEG. Doc. (1951) No. 66; LEG. Doc. (1952) No. 74;
LEG. Doc. (1953) No. 74; LEG. Doc. (1954) No. 42; LEG. Doc. (1955) No. 41.
97. The Committee is composed of the Commissioners of Education, Health,
Social Welfare, Mental Hygiene and Conservation, and the Superintendents of
Public Works and State Police, or their representatives. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEG. Doc. (1953) No. 74, pp. 3-4.
98. Id. at 4.
99. See id. at 5. The primary achievement of this program has been the
"notable progress" toward eliminating segregated schools by providing education
for the state's 1800 Indian children in local schools aided by special state financial
96.

MITTEE ON

aid.

N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT, LEG. Doc.

(1955) No. 41, pp. 3-5.
100. The background of the dispute over Niagara River power development
is summarized in Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara
Reservation,56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1153-64 (1956).
101. Act of Aug. 21, 1957, P.L. 85-159, 71 Stat. 401, 16 U.S.C. §836.
102. Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River Convention Between the
United States of America and Canada, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S. TREATIES AND OTHER
INT'L AGREEMENTS 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130.
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Federal Power Commission license was issued in January, 1958,103 and the
Power Authority, long frustrated in its desire to build America's largest hydroelectric project, was understandably anxious to commence construction as speedily
as possible. One of the tracts of land deemed necessary to the development by
the Power Authority was a portion of the Tuscarora Indian Reservation. In April,
1958, the Power Authority appropriatcd 1383 acres of tribal lands-about onefifth of the reservation-by filing a map of the tract and depcsiting a sum
estimated to be the fair market value with the State Comptroller, under a
procedure recently authorized by the legislature. 04 At the same time, the
Authority withdrew a slower judicial condemnation proceeding to take the Indian
lands which had been initiated a few weeks earlier. 10 5 But the appropriation
method proved to be the less expeditious after all-the construction workers and
apparatus which quickly appeared at the reservation borders were soon blocked
by a federal court action instituted by the Tuscaroras. 100
The Tuscarora Nation of Indians sought a declaratory judgment that the
state' 07 had no power to acquire the tribal lands without express federal consent
as well as an injunction against the appropriation of the lands. The state's opposing
arguments were not limited to narrow contentions-for example, that Congress
had in fact consented to the taking or that certain federal restrictions were
inapplicable because of the peculiar history of the tract involved' 08-which might
have averted a resurrection of the basic federal-state jurisdictional dispute over
Indian lands. Nor was New York content to restrict itself to demonstrating state
freedom to condemn lands and to put to one side the problem usually involved in
103. See Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d 885

(2d Cir. 1958), Cert. denied (Tuscarora Nations petition), 79 S. Ct. 66 (1958)
appeal docketed, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3087 (U.S. Sep. 19, 1958) (No. 386), sub nom.

Johnson v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians, (hereinafter cited as "Second Circuit

Opinion").
104. N.Y. HIGVAY LAW §30, as made applicable by N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW
§1007 (as amended by N.Y. LAws 1958, ch. 646).

105. See Second Circuit Opinion 887-88.
106. The action was instituted in the Southern District of New York on

April 19, 1958, and was transferred to the Western District on May 8, 1958, on

defendant's motion. A temporary restraining order originally entered to prohibit
the defendants from entering upon the land was subsequently extended, after a
modification permitting entries to make surveys, maps, examinations, borings
and similar tests. See Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 161 F.
Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

107. The named defendants were the Power Authority, Robert Moses, Its
Chairman, and John W. Johnson, New York Superintendent of Public Works.
Under the 1958 amendment of the Public Authorities Law, the Superintendent
of Public Works is charged with the duties of appropriating property In the
name of the state "when requested by the authority" and of removing the occupants and obtaining possession "where necessary." See N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW

§1007(10) and note 104 supra.
108. The land sought by the Power Authority had been acquired by the
Tuscaroras after 1800 by a purchase from the Holland Land Company, paid for
out of the proceeds received from the sale of Indian property In North Carolina.
It was therefore possible to argue that the protections of 1784 and 1794 treaties

did not extend to such lands. See note 117 infra.
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earlier litigation, attempted state control of private land dealings with Indians.
Rather, a formidable mass of documents submitted to the District Court-a
91-page memorandum, 10 a 175-page appendix, 110 and a 27-page affidavit"'reviewed the entire history of Indian lands disputes and sought primarily to
2
establish the inapplicability of federal restrictions to New York Indian lands.1
13
Federal Non-Intercourse Acts
are inapplicable to purchases of tribal lands in
the state; the proviso in the 1950 Civil Jurisdiction Act" 4 did not assure
federal control of land alienations in New York; federal restrictions concerning
"Indian country" generally apply only to reservations west of the Mississippisweeping assertions such as these mark this latest revival of New York's claims
to a unique state power over Indian lands. And the state's claims prevailed in
the District Court, as they had occasionally in the past." 5
The District Court's opinion dismissing the Tuscaroras' complaint" 6
contained statements of a scope to match the state's contentions: "Whatever
interest the United States has in the New. York Indians is directed not to Indian
lands as such, but to something more vague and general, such as their general
welfare"; "Indians in New York are wards of the State"; the status of New York
Indian lands "is in contrast to that of all lands, and particularly Indian lands,
outside the original thirteen colonies"; the Federal Non-Intercourse Act presents
"no bar to the exercise of eminent domain"; if, in enacting the 1950 Civil
Jurisdiction Act, "Congress had intended to place an absolute restraint on the
alienation of Indian lands in New York, or to assert an absolute paramount
authority in the Congress over New York Indian lands, it would not have
109. Memorandum of Defendants Power Authority of the State of New York
and Robert Moses in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary
Injunction and in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, supra note 2.
110. Defendants' Appendix, Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority,
supra note 2.
111. Affidavit of Henry S. Manley, Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power
Authority, Civil Case No. 7844 (W.D.N.Y. 1958). Mr. Manley, who served as a

consultant for the Power Authority and participated in the preparation of briefs
in this case, has played an important role in the formulation of the state's legal
position as to control of Indian affairs. He served in the Attorney General's office
for many years, retiring in 1955 after five months service as Solicitor General,
participated In much of the litigation on Indian matters in state and federal
courts, "drafted numerous opinions for the Attorney General on Indian questions
and prepared advice for legislative committees and departments of the State
government." Id. at 1-2.
112. See also Brief of the Attorney General for the New York Superintendent of Public Works and Brief of Power Authority and Robert Moses,
Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority (2d Cir. 1958).
113. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
115. See, e.g., the recent examples in United States v. Franklin County,
50 F. Supp. 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1943) (leases and conveyances of St. Regis lands), and
United States v. Cattaraugus County, 71 F. Supp. 413 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) (state
condemnation of Seneca lands for highway construction).
116. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, supra note 2.
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chosen so incongruous and unlikely time and place to do so," or have done so
"in so casual and off-handed a manner."" 7
This untenable challenge to federal authority was flatly rejected in every
significant respect by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.118 In an
opinion of July 24, 1958, the Court disagreed with the State's assertion that the
Non-Intercourse Act and the Civil Jurisdiction law "do not apply to the State of
New York which possesses sovereign power of condemnation over Indian lands,
independent of and never surrendered to, the Federal Government, derived from
its status as one of the thirteen original colonies.""19 To Judge Leonard P. Moore,
the decisions over the last 150 years revealed "uniform support for the doctrine
that the Indian tribes are wards of the United States and that a general guardian120
ship power is vested in the United States to protect them and their property."'
And that federal concern continues applicable to New York Indians: "Not only has
Congress not abandoned the field with respect to the property interests of Indian
tribes in the State of New York but it has, by the enactment of the express
reservation concerning land interests of the Indian tribes in New York in Title 25
U.S.C.A. §233 [the Civil Jurisdiction Law of 1950], pointed up and reaffirmed
its paramount authority over Indian tribal lands."''
The Power Authority's
appropriation of the lands presented a situation which "would seem to call for
the exercise of that guardianship protection which the United States has asserted
and exerted over the years";" 2 the District Court was wrong in believing that
23
the federal statutes were inapplicable to state takings.'
This did not mean, however, that the Power Authority could not in any
manner acquire the tribal property. Though a state acting alone is powerless, the
United States may take Indian lands by eminent domain 124 and may delegate
that right to Federal Power Commission licensees--"Of necessity, however, the
exercise of this power must be by the United States through Congress." 1 5 Here,
in view of the "size and extent of the Niagara Power Project" and the legislative
history, it was possible to infer Congressional authorization of the taking of the
tribal lands "from the nature of the project and its proximity to the Reservation
or from the impracticability of constructing it without taking a portion of the
117. IM. at 113, 114, 115, 116. The District Court also found the 1784 and 1794
treaties inapplicable to the lands purchased by the Tuscaroras after 1800: "It Is
not reasonable to interpret either treaty ... to apply the guarantees contained
therein to after-acquired lands ... purchased by plaintiff." Id. at 111.
118. Second Circuit Opinion.
119. Id. at 888.
120. Id. at 890.
121. Id. at 891.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 892.
Id. at 893.
See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
Second Circuit Opinion at 893.
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Tuscarora Reservation."12 6 However, the federal power of eminent domain
granted to the state agency must be exercised through one of the judicial
proceedings prescribed by the Federal Power Act, not through the short-cut
authorized by the state legislature which "enables the Power Authority to move
in, appropriate the land and remove the owner before he has had a chance to
have a judicial hearing."' 2 7 The fact that "construction workers are on the borders
of the Reservation ready to install power lines and cover the land with fill for
the reservoir dikes" was no reason to withhold invalidation of improper state
action-"aggressive construction activity should not be sufficient to nullify the
protective policy of the Government towards the Indians or the laws calculated
to enforce that policy. The Congressional concern, exhibited as recently as
1950, . . is ample evidence that 'guardianship' still exists. If the Indians are no
longer to be the wards of the United States such a change should be by Congressional enactment and not by court decision."'128 The court accordingly annulled
the Power Authority's appropriation of the Tuscarora lands but held that the
lands could be condemned by the procedures under the Federal Power Act.
CONCLUSION-TE FOR A NEW APPROACH
Oft-repeated, tradition-laden contentions are perhaps the most difficult to
dislodge. And the very weakness of a position may strengthen the reluctance to
yield and may indeed blind its defenders to the crumbling foundation. So it may
be with New York's assertion of a unique power over Indian lands; that may
explain the state's broad claims in the Tuscarora case, despite all that has gone
before. Though federal supremacy emerged prior to 1942, the confused history
offered some comforting strands to the state: the Forness decision could be
brushed aside as a sentimental aberration in a case in which, in any event, the
state did not participate; the remoteness of its source and the emphasis on matters
other than land transactions might soften the impact of the federal legislation of
1950 on those clinging to notions of state independence from federal restrictions.
Yet there is basis for confidence that the most recent jurisdictional delineation
will permeate where earlier clarifications failed to eliminate residual illusions.
The Tuscarora decision of the Court of Appeals came, after all, in a case which
the state deliberately chose to make the most elaborate presentation of its
position and to argue on the broadest possible grounds. All the greater the
significance, then-and all the more penetrating the likely impact-of the
repudiation of New York's contentions. The court's insistence that federal
guardianship over tribal land holdings persists thus furnishes an appropriate
occasion to initiate, albeit belatedly, some needed changes in governmental
attitudes, by the nation as well as the state.
126. Id. at 893.
127. Id. at 894.
128. Id. at 894.
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State action. Today New York has authority to apply its laws to occurrences on the Indian reservations. But it is for the federal government, not the
state, to decide whether or not tribal lands may or must be conveyed to nonIndians. As a first stage in manifesting its acceptance of this sphere of federal
control, New York might well consider eliminating the Indian lands provision
of its constitution.
In 1777, when the provision was first adopted, the state could properly be
regarded as the chief guardian of tribal land ownership. Subsequent events,
however, have destroyed all legal basis for this view. The original function of
the constitutional requirement of state consent to Indian land sales was to
demonstrate amity toward the Indians. Whether it ever served its declared
purpose is debatable. Today, in any event, the good will of the state toward its
Indian population is actively manifested by the extension of services rather than
by controls of land transaction. Indeed, the present significance of the constitutional provision is primarily a symbolic one-a symbol far more likely to arouse
Indian distrust and hostility than to further friendship. In the Taicarora case,
for example, the District Court invoked the provision in rejecting the Indians'
complaint: "The State Constitution .. ., far from presenting a bar to public
condemnation, discloses an intent by the state to exercise exclusive control over
Indian lands in New York."12 9
The minor respects in which the constitutional restriction may still retain
significance are not sufficient to justify its retention. Thus, New York may
presumably control the alienation of tribal lands owned by two small Long Island
groups, the Shinnecocks and the Poosepatucks, since these are not recognized
as Indian tribes by the federal government3Rs Retention of the constitutional
provision because of its applicability to 300 acres of reservation lands hardly seems
warranted, however: the legislature has already manifested its lively concern for
the Long Island Indians,131 and the protections and services needed by these small
communities can be--and are being' 8 ---provided without the oblique support
of Article I, Section 13. The section also theoretically applies to disposition of
lands privately owned by individual Indians outside the reservations, 3 3 another
area untouched by federal control The provision has, however, long ceased to
have any practical significance as to such individual holdings. Since the nineteenth
129. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, supra note 2, at 116.

130. The Long Island Indians intermarried with Negroes at least as early

as the pre-Civil War period. See

WHIPPLE REPORT

at 54; 1948 HEARINGS, 217;

H. R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 531, 593 (1952).
131. See e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAw art. 9 (Shinnecock tribe); N.Y. LAWs 1955,

ch. 838.

132. See, e.g., District Attorney of Suffolk County v. Great Cove Realty Co.,
137 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1955); N.Y. JOINT LEis.LATIvE COM IMITEE ON INDIAN APFAIRS,
REPORT, LEG.

Doc. (1954) No. 42, p. 4.

133. Indeed, the only early litigation involving the constitutional provisions

dealt with such individual Indian land holdings. See note 31 supra.
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century, the legislature has given its blanket consent to sales of non-reservation
lands by Indians-a consent renewed as recently as 1956.134 The provision, with
needless complexity, seemingly confers a special status on such lands, but the
legislature has with complete validity terminated that status.
These marginal remnants of arguable vitality are easily outweighed by
the dear vices of Article I, Section 13. The section, at the least, blocks attainment
of a truly simplified constitution.135 More importantly, the provision implies a nonexistent state power over federally protected tribal lands-an implication which
has contributed to the confusion over Indian land controls in the past and which
continues to feed Indian fears of state designs on their tribal property and
integrity.
Legislative initiative to eliminate the Indian lands provision might well be
joined with a thorough reexamination of the state Indian Law, a task already
begun by the Joint Legislative Committee on Indian Affairs. Particular attention
needs to be given to the elimination of laws reflecting the constitutional
assumption of state power over tribal lands.'3 6 If a substantial need for state
authority over tribal land ownership exists in specific areas, as perhaps with
respect to acquisition of lands for highway construction, a state request for
express congressional consent would no doubt be heeded, as in the 1940's. Such
recognition of federal authority, consonant with the present distribution of
governmental power, would no doubt avert much litigation. And most importantly,
it would assure that the state's admirable efforts to promote Indian welfare would
more effectively further their avowed ultimate purpose of expediting voluntary
assimilation of New York's Indians, by removing Indian resistance generated by
illegitimate state assertions of power over tribal lands.
Federal action. National officials must commence a far more consistent
and energetic exercise of their responsibilities if governmental relations with
New York Indians are to improve significantly. Federal inattention and
ambivalence must bear much of the blame for the confusions and conflicts in
federal-state relations which mark the history of New York Indian affairs. The
Court of Appeals in the Tuscarora case noted that "a large measure of social and
economic intercourse relating to Indian tribal matters in the State of New York
has been left to the State of New York through either the indifference or
134. N.Y. INDIAN LAw §2 as amended by N.Y. LAws 1956, ch. 243.
MCKINNEY'S 1956 N.Y. Sass. LAws 1656 (Governor's memorandum).
135.

See

See N. Y. SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COmmrrrEE ON THE REVISION AND SIMPLI-

FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, REPORT OF THE INTER-LAw
THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CoNsTrIUTION,

SCHOOL COMMrrIEE ON

N.Y. LEG. Doc. (1958)

No. 57, esp. at pp. 33-42.

136. See, e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAw §§7 (partition and alienation of tribal lands),
12 (highways on tribal lands), 24 (Onondaga leases), 83 (Tonawanda leases), 90
(erection of poles and wires).
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approval or express authorization of the federal executive officials who at a
particular time had the responsibility for the care of the Indians.""1 7 "Indifference,"
unfortunately, has been far the most common characteristic of federal action; it
was largely responsible for the state's assumption of regulatory jurisdiction
recognized by the federal laws of 1948 and 1950 and it undoubtedly contributed
to the notions of state independence as to tribal land ownership as well. Though
national guardianship of New York tribal lands is clearly manifes, ed by federal
treaties and statutes, it has only intermittently been expressed in official practice.
The reaffirmation of the federal concern and the concomitant restriction on
state power in the 1950 legislation apparently had as little effect on federal
attitudes as on those of some state officials. In 1954, to be sure, the Department
of the Interior reported to Congress that termination of federal treaty obligations
to New York Indians was not desirable and that restrictions on land transactions
should continue. 138 And in a study prepared at that time, the Department noted
that discharge of treaty obligations "usually means furnishing legal assistance
through the Department of litigation affecting the use or occupancy of these
lands."'81 9 But the recent experience of the Tuscaroras in seeking federal aid to
oppose the New York Power Authority's appropriation of their lands illustrates
the difficulties of giving content to recognized federal responsibilities. The
Interior Department's response to the Tuscarora request substituted questions
140
about the scope of the treaties for a firm delineation of federal responsibilities;
and a discussion of alternative methods of contesting the state's claims-in the
courts or in a license proceeding before the Federal Power Commission-included
the puzzling statement: "As your reservation lands are under state jurisdiction,
this Department is not in a position to present your case for you."' 4' Nor were
the Tuscaroras able to elicit any guardianship interest before the FPC: the
Commission, in issuing the license to the New York Power Authority, concluded
that the question "whether the licensee is empowered to acquire [Tuscarora] land
in eminent domain proceedings is, in our view, a question to be resolved by a
142
court of competent jurisdiction."'
137. Second Circuit Opinion at 889.
138. Letter of Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary of Interior, 'to the Speaker

of the United States House of Representatives, Jan. 4, 1954, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 7, Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, supra note 2.
139. See "Background Data on Indians of New York," p. 4, submitted with
Lewis Letter, note 138 supra.
140. Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Interior Aandahl to Harry

Patterson, Chief of the Tuscarora Indians, dated Nov. 1; 1957, Defendants'
Appendix, Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Authority, supra note 2.

141. Id. at 171a.
142. Second Circuit Opinion at 889, 890. A petition for review of the FPC order
is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Ibid. Compare Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §797(e), stating
that FPC licenses for the construction of reservoirs and power houses "upon any
part of the public lands and reservations of the United States" may be Issued
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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Meaningful exercise of federal guardianship surely requires more than such
half-hearted, confused, at best careless, responses by federal agencies. And, as
the taking of lands for federally authorized developments becomes an increasingly
pressing threat to tribal holdings, 143 Congress, too, must exercise its responsibility
with greater care. Reservation lands are not and should not be immune from
appropriation for power projects necessary to the national welfare. Any congressional authorization of a taking should, however, be based upon a deliberate
and explicit determination that the specific tract on one of the fast diminishing
Indian reservations is indeed necessary to the project. Though the courts found
such congressional authorizations in the recent takings of Seneca 4 4 as well as
Tuscarora lands in New York, the indications of congressional approval were
145
sporadic and tenuous indeed.
Attachment to tribal lands, adherence to tribal organizations-these may
seem anachronistic loyalties in the middle of the twentieth century. Yet the
persistence of tribal cohesiveness is not altogether startling; it is at least an
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
only after a Commission finding "that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created."
[On November 14, 1958, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded the case to the FPC for a speedy and specific finding as to
"interference" as required by the quoted provisions of the Federal Power Act.
Moreover, the Court commented that acquisition of the Tuscarora lands did not
appear " a matter of necessity to the construction of the project." N. Y. Timeg,
Nov. 15, 1958, §1, p. 1, col. 2.1
143. The Office of the Federal Indian Agent in New York was abolished in
1949, see N.Y. LEG. Doc. (1954) No. 42, p. 7, but this administrative reorganization
presumably merely required a more intensive exercise of federal responsibility by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior in Washington. Nor
is a diminution in federal administrative responsibility warranted by the congressional statement of policy, H. CONG. Rns. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B 132
(1953), indicating a desire to free New York Indians, among others, from
"Federal supervision and control" at the earliest possible time. If that still
represents congressional policy, it has at least not yet been implemented in any
way. Indeed, Congress took no action on legislative proposals submitted by the
Interior Department in 1954 to further such a policy, although the Department's
suggestions would not have terninated federal protections of New York tribal
lands in any significant respect. See note 138 supra.
144. Thus, to speak only of New York reservations, in addition to the
atempted appropriation of Tuscarora lands for the Niagara River Power Project,
Seneca lands have recently been taken by the United States for the Allegheny
Reservoir Project, a flood control development on the Allegheny River. See
United States v. 21,250 Acres of Land, 161 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.Y. 1957); Seneca
Nation of Indians v. Brucker, Civ. No. 2202-57 (D.D.C., March 24, 1958) (unreported opinion of Judge McGarraghy).
145. Ibid. In the Seneca Nation case, the District Court rejected the Indians'
contention that Congress can authorize the taking of lands protected by treaties
only by specific legislation and found that an act appropriating money for the
construction of the Project "manifested a clear Congressional intention." Seneca
Nation of Indians v. Brucker, Civ. No. 2202-57 (D.D.C., March 24, 1958), p. 3
(unreported opinion). Compare the insistence on "clear Congressional action" to
indicate "an intention to abrogate the terms of the treaty" in another recent
condemnation case involving Indian lands, United States v. 2005.32 Acres of Land,
160 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D. S. Dak. 1958).
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understandable defensive reaction in the light of the history of inroads on Indian
possessions. In any event, tribal loyalties are facts which must be recognized if
the governmental policy of maximum voluntary assimilation of Indians is to
progress. The first and essential step in furthering that policy and respecting
those loyalties must be a more pervasive acceptance of the federal-state division
of responsibilities. Recognition of federal control of Indian land ownership and
more consistent exercise of federal guardianship duties; self-limitation by the
state to the legitimate sphere of its activities by keeping hands off tribal lands and
furthering affirmative welfare services-minimal efforts in such a program will
surely produce large returns in reducing Indian distrust, diminishing the causes of
separationist loyalties and promoting more enlightened governmental relations
with New York's Indians.

